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HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES AND FIRM INNOVATION:   





This paper examines the effects of human resource (HR) policies on firm innovation. Specifically, 
we argue that firms who implement policies to stimulate job autonomy and performance-based pay 
will be more likely to innovate, as proxied by investments in R&D. In addition, we contend that 
the institutional (i.e., labour regulations) and competitive (i.e., pressure from imports) contexts in 
which a firm operates will affect the relationship between HR policies and innovation, albeit in 
different ways. We test these hypotheses using a dataset of more than 900 firms across a 
heterogenous set of 12 countries, majority of which are emerging markets. We find strong empirical 
backing for the role of both job autonomy and performance-based pay policies in stimulating firm 
innovation, and partial support for the moderating effects of institutional and competitive contexts 
of this relationship. 
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Innovation performance rests on a firm’s ability to create, maintain, protect and utilize knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Daneels, 2002; Inderts, 2009; Maksimov, Wang and Luo, 2017; 
Kafouros, Aliyev, and Krammer, 2021), and its success is often a reflection of the macro-external 
environment in which the firm operates (Von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; Aw, Roberts, and Xu, 
2011; Heij et al., 2020). Among its many determinants, Human Resource (HR) management is 
particularly important for innovation (Lee and Kelley, 2008; Brenton and Levin, 2012) as human 
capital remains an indispensable ingredient in this process (O’Conner and McDermott, 2004; Loon, 
Otaye-Ebede, and Stewart; 2020). HR policies have the potential to create and sustain a suitable 
infrastructure for the development of the new products, technologies and organizational routines 
by stimulating employees to be creative, collaborative, independent and ambitious (Lau and Ngo, 
2004; Shipton et al., 2006; Beugelsdijk, 2008). Yet, despite these innate opportunities, we still lack 
sufficient knowledge on how and when internal HR policies are able to successfully stimulate a 
firm’s ability to innovate (Andreeva et al., 2017; Park et al., 2019). 
To answer this question we examine the relationship between HR policies and innovation 
as well as several contingencies that can affect this relationship. To capture innovation we focus 
on one of the most frequently used indicators of innovation in the literature, namely investment in 
R&D (Coombs and Bierly, 2006; Raymond and St‐Pierre, 2010; Heij et al., 2020). While 
innovation is a collective result of creative efforts of individuals (Wang and Cheng, 2010; Sears 
and Baba, 2011), organizational policies put together the work environment in which employees’ 
creativity can be both encouraged and stifled (Amabile, 1988). Positive internal prescriptions will 
facilitate a firm’s generation and implementation of novel ideas (Beugelsdijk, 2008) as well as 




In particular, we propose that firms with specific HR policies regarding promotion and merit-based 
pay (PBP) or job autonomy (JA) will be more likely to pursue innovation by investing in R&D. 
Furthermore, we posit that the efficiency of these internal mechanisms to promote new product 
development and innovation will be conditioned by the economic and institutional characteristics 
of the environment in which a firm operates (Krammer, 2019). Specifically, we theorize that greater 
competitive pressures from foreign competitors as well as more rigid labour regulations will have 
a similar, yet assymetric effect on this relationship: they will weaken the efficiency of PBP policies 
while enhancing the effects of JA measures on firm innovation. 
We test our hypotheses using data on more than 900 firms from ten transition economies 
from Central Asia and Eastern Europe, plus India and Germany. This mix of countries exhibits 
significant heterogeneity in terms of labour regulations (Botero et al. 2004), institutional quality 
(Meyer et al. 2009), and national innovative infrastructure (Krammer 2009) which allows us to put 
to the test the effects of HR policies across very different economic and institutional settings. 
Furthermore, only 40 percent of firms in this context perform formal R&D suggesting that such 
commitments are salient indicators of their innovative performance, more so than new products 
which are widely reported by firms in less developed markets (Lederman, 2010; Goedhuys, 2007)1. 
 We make several contributions. First, we showcase the complex role of the external context 
in influencing the effectiveness of a firm’s HR policies towards its innovative performance 
(Bamber et al., 2016; Glaister et al., 2018). While prior studies have examined the role of internal 
capabilities such as organizational culture (Lau and Ngo, 2004) or management skills (Park et al., 
 
1 For instance, the average percentage fo firms introducing new products in Eastern Europe and Central Asia was 57% 
while only 26% of firms invest in formal R&D (Krammer, 2019, p.12). Similar large differences between these two 
proxies have been reported for African nations (Goedhuys, 2007) and more generally for developing versus developed 
nations (Lederman, 2010, p.618) confirming the idea that, particularly in the case of emerging markets, the propensity 




2019) we show that external factors, such as competition from imported products (Nocco, 
Ottaviano and Salto, 2019; Traiberman, 2019), interact differently with various HR policies in 
determining firm innovation. This finding supports recent calls in this area for further investigation 
of the interplay and contingencies of these complex relationships (Andreeva et al., 2019).  
Second, we contribute to the institution-based view of the firm (Peng, Sun, Pinkham and 
Chen, 2009) by demonstrating the indirect effect of formal institutions, as captured by labour 
regulations, in moderating the relationship between HR practices and firm innovation. While extant 
studies have examined the direct role of institutions in determining firm performance (Hitt et al., 
2000; Yasar, Paul, and Ward, 2011; Fuentelsaz, Garrido, and Maicas, 2020), our knowledge of the 
nature and magnitude of the indirect effects of institutions remains scant (Lu,  Liu, Wright and 
Filatotchev, 2014; Krammer, 2015), and in particular towards explicating the external factors that 
enable or deter innovation performance (Krammer, 2019).  
Finally, we highlight the importance of HR policies (i.e., job autonomy and pay/promotion 
incentives) for firm innovation in an international, comparative setting of 12 heterogeneous 
economies around the world, as opposed to previous studies in this area which have all been 
confined to single countries (e.g., Lau and Ngo, 2004; Beugelsdijk, 2008; Ceylan, 2013; Andreeva 
et al, 2017). In this way, we are able to provide more definitive and generalizable evidence on the 
direct role HR policies play in stimulating firm innovation and some of the salient macro- 
contingencies that affect this relationship, augmenting a large body of work on the drivers of 
innovation and potential policy responses (Von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; Krammer, 2009; 
Lopez-Berzosa and Gawer, 2014; Schot and Steinmueller, 2018).  
 
 




2.1 Creativity and firm innovation 
Innovation is a robust prerequisite for firm survival, growth and commercial success, and 
therefore finding out what makes certain firms more innovative than others is one of the key areas 
of research across multiple disciplines (Schumpeter, 1934; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Among 
the multitude of explanations proposed and vetted, organizational behavior scholars have paid 
special attention to creativity of employees, as one of the channels through which innovation 
flourishes in organizations (Sears and Baba, 2011). As creative individuals are employed following 
a selective hiring procedure, and following a proper induction and training, organizations can 
benefit from “exploratory learning” (Shipton et al., 2005) where ideas are flowing freely and risk-
taking is part of the cultural norms (Barros and Lazzarini, 202; Engel et al., 2015).  
However, finding, selecting and recruiting high-quality and creative employees is not 
sufficient for stimulating innovation. As management scholars point out, firm policies need to also 
be “tuned” to match the work environment to the firm’s strategic focus on innovation. Thus, a good 
mix of policies (e.g., autonomy, flexibility, trainings, leadership styles or information-sharing 
patterns) needs to be put in place for organizations to be fully taking advantage of the intrinsic 
creativity of their employees (Shalley, Zhou and Oldham, 2004; Wang and Cheng, 2010). 
Subsequently, one of the main organizational challenges for innovating firms is “to build room for 
individuality into the bureaucratic culture, to free the creative potential of the employee” (Evans, 
Farquhar and Landreth, 1989, p. 177)2. In this respect, the right mix of HR policies can provide 
 
2 A good example in this way is Google where, according to Forbes, the organizational culture puts a particular 
emphasis on encouraging creativity, prioritizing and actively encouraging innovation, allowing flexibility, 
communicating openly, and providing independence to employees, among other things (13 Reasons Google Deserves 




organizations with multiple avenues to stimulate creativity, risk taking and overall innovativeness 
of their employees. 
2.2 Human resource policies and firm innovation 
Besides tapping into the creativity of employees, a firm’s ability to innovate has also other 
important levers at the level of the organization (Amabile, 1988; Bloom et al., 2014) one of which 
is the use of dedicated HR practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011). Coined as “the management 
of work and people” (Boxall, Purcell and Wright, 2007), HR practices and systems have been 
linked to innovation performance of organisations across multiple disciplines.  
For instance, Lan and Ngo (2004) take a look at the integration of HR practices into a 
system, and the role of organisational culture in determining the success of this system towards 
innovation of firms from Hong Kong. Shipton et al. (2006) examine longitudinally this question 
across 22 UK manufacturing companies, and find a positive relationship between HR practices and 
technological innovation. Similar effects are also found for both incremental and radical type of 
innovations produced by Beugelsdijk (2008) in a sample of Dutch firms, rounding up a consensus 
on the association between HR practices and innovation. In addition to examining direct effects, 
more recent contributions in this area focus on the interplay between various HR practices, 
bundling effects and commitments (Ceylan, 2013), combinations of HR policies (Andreeva et al., 
2017) and the role of firm-specific idiosyncrasies and abilities, e.g., cooperation, skills and 
brokering aptitudes (Park et al., 2019). However, despite this wealth of knowledge, we still lack 
robust evidence both on the usefulness of HR policies for innovation in organizations and the 
contingencies which affect this relationship, particularly in an international, comparative context. 
From a theoretical standpoint there are numerous arguments to support a clear and positive 




the resource based view of the firm (RBV) postulates that HR practices have a real potential to 
enhance creativity in an organization, and therefore increase innovation activities in the firm 
(Beugelsdijk, 2008). Hence, the design of work structures and job autonomy, flexible work 
schedules, training and performance-based pay, especially when combined, support the integration 
of knowledge, and thus creativity and innovation within the organization (Amabile et al., 1996; 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005; Kang, Morris and Snell, 2007; Wang and Cheng, 2010).  
Secondly, from dynamic capability (DC) viewpoint, firms need to renew their competencies 
by “appropriately adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external organization skills, 
resources and functional competences to match the requirements of a changing environment” 
(Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997, p.515).  Therefore, one cannot stimulate innovation  absent of an 
HR policy structure in place which would allow both employees and management to pursue it also 
individually.  
Finally, from an agency perspective we can conceptualize HR policies as a way to align the 
interests of employees and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Barros and Lazzarini, 2012) 
which can then further foster innovation as a result of having common objectives, clear 
communication, and access to resources/support to achieve these goals (Huselid, 1995; Barros and 
Lazzarini, 2012; Zoghi, Mohr and Meyer, 2010). Overall, these different theoretical tenets support 
overwhelmingly the idea that organizations can trigger significant positive effects in terms of 
performance both at individual and organizational levels, simply by choosing and customizing its 
HR policies in light of its goals (Laursen and Foss, 2003; Zhu, Hong and Liu, 2013).  
 With this study we follow this line of inquiry, and in response to recent calls in the literature 
(Sparrow et al, 2016; Seeck and Diehl, 2017), we seek to deepen our knowledge on the direct 
effects of two such dimensions of HR policies (i.e., job autonomy and merit-based pay and 




imports and labour regulations) that we believe will affect the relationship between HR policies 
and innovation. In the following sections we will develop theoretical rationales for these effects. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
2.3.1 Performance-based policies and firm innovation 
Pay and promotion based on merit, performance or achievements is a common way of rewarding 
above-average employees by making these rewards and the overall process more result-oriented. 
In addition to these direct benefits, such systems have been consistently shown to promote lower 
turnover rates among employees, as well as better financial performers of firms that adopt them 
(Huselid, 1995). With regards to innovation, PBP policies have been closely linked to extrinsic 
motivation, acting as a catalyst for employee creativity (Barros and Lazzarini, 2012) and “the types 
of innovative behavior that management requires” (Evans, Farquar and Landreth, 1989, p. 187). 
However, despite these aforementioned benefits, the effect of PBP policies on innovation 
is still a subject of debate, particularly given some of the mixed empirical evidence on this issue 
(Laursen and Foss, 2003; Barros and Lazzarini, 2011). On one hand, performance-based pay 
policies undermine extrinsic motives and push people towards the “beaten path” and “traditional” 
methods instead of innovative yet riskier approaches, in order to maximize their income (Amabile, 
1988; Shipton et al., 2006). In addition, since job performance is often a difficult and subjective 
metric, applying extrinsic rewards may hamper the creativity of people in complex and innovative 
jobs, where goal posts are more difficult to be observed or quantified (Shalley, Zhou and Oldham, 
2004). Finally, another difficulty in providing a good link between performance and pay is the fact 
that nowadays most work tasks are performed in teams rather than individually, making it even 




(Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005: Krammer, 2021). All these arguments would suggest a rather 
murkier relationship between PBP policies and organizational innovation, particularly in settings 
where objectives/goals are more difficult to measure, where innovations are developed in large, 
heterogeneous teams and in contexts where innovation is less of a priority. 
However, on the other hand, PBP policies present multiple and tangible benefits for 
organizational innovation. Such policies motivate employees to focus on a given target, and the 
recognition of their accomplishments in this area triggers a clear and positive response in terms of 
spurring firm innovation (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005; Inderst, 2009). In addition, PBP 
policies also represent a very efficient selection mechanism (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011) where 
least productive workers often leave the firm as a result of linking their compensation or promotion 
to certain goals, objectives and metrics. As a result of these shifts in the lower-end of the 
employees’ productivity, a firm’s efficiency and resource availability levels will improve 
automatically, commonly triggering increases in overall productivity and innovativeness of these 
organizations (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011). Lastly, PBP measures have been found to promote 
the development of certain more radical and innovative ideas that facilitate innovation in 
technological, organizational and production areas of organizations, and subsequently boosting 
both the efficiency and profitability of these firms (Inderst, 2009).  
Building on these arguments and given our focus on firm innovation we conjecture that this 
commitment is a strategic decision by the firm and congruence between its HR policies and its 
innovation strategies (i.e., R&D investments) will be easier to reinforce each other (Zoghi, Mohr 
and Meyer, 2010).  As a result, we expect HR policies such as performance-based pay and 
promotion to be useful segways for managers seeking to make a firm more innovative by enabling 




Hypothesis 1:  The use of promotion-based or performance-based pay policies by firms will be 
associated with a higher propensity to engage in innovation through R&D investment. 
 
 
2.3.2 Job autonomy and firm innovation  
Arguments from RBV and dynamic capabilities theories suggest that policies concerning job 
autonomy (JA) will impact organizational innovation through several mechanisms. First, autonomy 
can act as an extrinsic motive, so it can be used with relative ease as component of the reward 
system to promote innovative activities (Mumford, 2000). Second, JA can lead to significant 
improvements in terms of efficiency by delegating to a large extent this decision to each employee. 
As a result, determining one’s own tasks and projects, work hours, deadlines, and working pace 
within a reasonable frame can lead to an effective distribution of tasks within the organization.  
Regarding innovation, it can trigger self-selection of individuals into teams and projects, based on 
their affinity, attractiveness and perceived contributions, which often result in better chances to 
innovate (Krammer et al., 2019). 
 Third, job autonomy comes together with more employee empowerment, which means that 
employees enjoy more flexibility in reacting to changes and uncertainty (Beugelsdijk, 2008).  As 
such, JA is a vital avenue for innovation as “job-related problem solving has been found to be the 
most important aid in helping professional personnel keep abreast of developments in their fields” 
(Allen and Katz, 1989, p. 196). Without significant levels of JA, employees have to rely more on 
organizations to provide them a roadmap in terms of achievable expectations and goals in terms of 
innovation. In addition, JA allows employees to fully take advantage of their intrinsic creative or 
innovative traits, and thereby maximizing their individual innovation performance as well as that 




Lastly, another benefit of JA is decentralization and a flattened organizational hierarchy 
which often results in more innovation. The more autonomy the workers gain, the more control 
they have over the decisions regarding tasks and working conditions (Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2011). Determining the degree of decentralization, the hierarchy of the firm makes an important 
decision, because giving up authority at the management level means that “problem-solving rights 
are delegated to the shop floor” (Laursen and Foss, 2003, p.248). If employees enjoy managerial 
support in finding their own solutions to problems, this will lead to employees collecting, 
organizing and, most importantly, using more and more information and knowledge from different 
parts of the firm (Lee and Kelley, 2008). Ultimately, this process fosters not only effectiveness of 
organizations, but also their commitment to innovation (Zoghi, Mohr and Meyer, 2010).  
Considering all these rationales we propose that: 
Hypothesis 2:  The use of job autonomy policies by firms will be associated with a higher 
propensity to engage in innovation through R&D investment. 
 
2.3.3 The role of the competitive environment 
The competitive environment is a crucial determinant of firm success. While very high levels of 
competition might be detrimental for firms’ productivity and innovation orientation (Aghion et al., 
2005), most markets and niches exhibit a positive relationship between the degree of market 
competition and innovation as a result of unlocking creative and entrepreneurial forces (Zehra and 
Garvis, 2000; Krammer, 2009) as well as a tighter coupling between firm structure and strategies 
(Burton and Obel, 2018), and in this case, HR policies and innovation strategy (Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2013). In particular, the nature of competition from foreign-produced goods and services 
faced by firms shifts their focus from price considerations to technological sophistication and 




environments (particularly from imported foreign products that usually have an technological edge) 
can trigger significant reactions from firms in terms of HRM and innovation strategies (Nocco et 
al., 2019; Traiberman, 2019). Thus, competition from imports will weaken the perceived effect of 
performance-pay HR policies on innovation for several reasons. 
First, import competition will increase the pressure on local incumbents to reduce costs or 
upgrade their products. In turn, such competition will leave less leeway for incumbent firms to 
attract and motivate their employees through performance-pay incentives, as most efforts will be 
directed towards fighting for market share (Pudelko and Harzing, 2007). Second, the enhanced risk 
in innovating may reduce the firm’s strategic rationales and personal enthusiasm for increasing pay 
for employees’ performance in the uncertain process of innovation (Florida, 2006). Subsequently, 
this will trigger a response to focus on core-competences and markets as opposed to exploration of 
new activities via innovation (Anand et al., 2009). Finally, a well-known outcome from the 
literature is that domestic firms often believe that the return from innovation will be jeopardised in 
a hostile competitive situation (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006). In this case, competition from 
exports involves foreign-based firms that have a competitive edge either in terms of technology or 
in terms of costs, both of which will trigger a negative reaction from domestic firms in terms of 
stimulating their employees via performance-based mechanisms (Liu, 2008). 
     In turn, we expect that competitive pressure from imports will positively moderate the 
effects of job autonomy on innovation for several reasons. In the first instance, import competition 
will trigger a greater necessity to attract, retain and motivate highly capable employees (Bloom et 
al., 2010). Thus, greater competition from imports and foreign firms will increase the incentives 
for domestic firms to recruit and retain high quality human capital without competing on wages. 
Job autonomy provides an attractive alternative for domestic firms to do so and offers additional 




Second, job autonomy can provide an alternate way for firms to retain key workers and in the face 
of import competition, the role of the latter in stimulating innovation will become even more 
critical. Hence, by providing greater autonomy, a firm facing this type of competition will entrust 
its key employees with greater responsibilities and leeway in terms of how to tackle daily 
challenges (Purcell and Hutchinson, 2007). These could constitute important advantages in highly 
dynamic and great growth potential environments, such as emerging markets, where highly-skilled 
human capital is rather scarce and at a premium for innovating firms (Krammer, 2009).   
Summing up, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 3: The competitive context (i.e., intensity of competition from imports) will negatively 
moderate the relation between performance based pay policies and a firm’s propensity to 
engage in innovation through R&D investment (H3a), and respectively positively moderate 
the relation between job autonomy policies and firm’s propensity to engage in innovation 
through R&D investment (H3b). 
 
2.3.4 The role of the institutional environment 
According to the institutional theory (North, 1990; Scott, 2001) firms respond to both formal and 
informal institutional stimuli by adopting certain behaviors and strategies which fit the rules, 
regulations, norms and cultural idiosyncrasies of countries in which they operate. Following these 
insights, we examine the a specific institutional feature (i.e., stringency of labour regulations) that 
is particularly salient for our phenomenon of interest (i.e., HR policies). We therefore argue that 
the stringency of labour laws in a country will moderate, although in different ways, the effects of 
HR policies on firm innovative endeavours.  
There are several reasons for which the effect of performance-based pay policies on 




labour regulations in a country will have desirable societal benefits by reducing income dispersion 
(Adams and Deakin, 2014), in our case, they will likely diminish the ability of firms to motivate 
employees to take risks and innovate in these environments (Haucap and Wey, 2004). Second, this 
decrease in the scope for performance-based pay will result in less interest and personal 
investments from employees in developing innovations in these firms, and subsequently, thereby 
weakening the effect of performance-based pay on firms’ innovative investments (Gooderham, 
Nordhaug and Ringdal, 1998). Finally, stringent labour regulations will also reduce a firm’s ability 
to attract, select, and retain creative and innovative employees on competitive bases, such as above-
market salaries and bonuses that are contingent on personal performance or targets (Acharya, 
Baghai, and Subramanian, 2013). Hence, more stringent wage regulations in a country will 
ultimately improve inequality in a society but likely decrease (i.e., weaken) firms’ ability to employ 
performance-based policies to pursue novel ideas and innovations for future commercial gains 
(Aghion et al., 2019). 
In turn, more stringent labour regulations will have the opposite effect (i.e., strengthen the 
impact) on the relation between job autonomy HR policies and firm innovation for the following 
reasons. First, stringent regulations will provide strong guarantee for employees’ rights and job 
protection which in turn will provide them more leeway towards pursuing riskier, more creative, 
and explorative endeavors that otherwise would not have been possible (Towse, 2001). Second, 
the empowerment effect that accompanies job autonomy providing more flexibility and scope for 
reaction to change and uncertainty (Beugelsdijk, 2008) will be reinforced by strong institutional 
provisions regarding the protection of employees. As such, while many of these endeavors could 
end up in failure, this greater flexibility through HR policies and the stronger job protection via 
institutionalized labour practices will provide employees greater scope to pursue more innovative 




Sanbartolomé, 2020). Finally, more stringent labour regulations will also enhance the benefits of 
flatter hierarchical structures in terms of less red-tape or approvals for undertaking innovative 
projects by further promoting individuals to pursue such endeavours within the scope of their 
regular roles and without significant organizational frictions (e.g., approvals, bureaucratic hurdles) 
that characterize organizations with more hierarchical structures (Pichault and McKeown, 2019). 
Given all these effects, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4: The institutional context (i.e., the stringency of labour regulations) will negatively 
moderate the relation between performance-based pay policies and a firm’s propensity to 
engage in innovation through R&D investment (H4a), and respectively positively moderate 
the relation between job autonomy policies and firm’s propensity to engage in innovation 
through R&D investment (H4b). 
 
4. METHOD 
4.1 Data and sample 
We employ data from the Management, Organization and Innovation (MOI) Survey, conducted by 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank (2008-
2009). This dataset has been previously employed for examining firm innovation across countries 
(Maksimov, Wang and Luo, 2017; Nuruzzaman, Gaur and Sambharya, 2019; Bahl, Lahiri and 
Mukherjee, 2020). The survey covers manufacturing firms from 10 emerging economies from 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (e.g., Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), plus Germany and India. After eliminating all missing 
observations for our main variables of interest from the dataset, we are left with answers from more 
than 1200 firms across 12 countries. Finally, data regarding import competition is not 




for testing those particular specifications/models. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the 
matrix of pairwise correlations for all these variables. 
--- Table 1 here --- 
Dependent variable. Following previous literature we capture firm innovation using a binary 
variable (RD) which measures whether the firm invests or not in R&D activities (e.g. Wakelin, 
1998; Lederman, 2010; Santiago, 2013; Krammer, 2019). In addition to this variable, we employ 
also an alternate measure for innovation (i.e., patents), as detailed in the robustness section. 
--- Table 2 here --- 
Explanatory variables.  
To capture various dimensions of HR policies using different questions in the MOI survey we 
employ PCA (Principal Component Analysis), which has been previously used in this literature for 
similar data reduction purposes (Laursen and Foss, 2003; Beugelsdijk, 2008). We start with 7 
potential variables to capture PBP and JA policies using PCA with orthogonal varimax rotation to 
better fit the data (Abdi and Williams, 2010). For a detailed description of these variables please 
see Table 3. Four of these 7 items loaded into two factors with Eigen values greater than 1 which 
we identify as PBP and JA components of HR policies (Table 2). The results confirm two variables 
that capture job autonomy (JA): taskallocation, which takes the values 1-5 depending on who 
determines the allocation of tasks for workers, 1 being only factory managers and 5 if it is only the 
workers decision (and 3 being when the two parties participate equally in the decision-making). 
The second variable is pacework, which is also a Likert variable with values between 1 and 5, 
measuring who sets the pace of work at the establishment, in similar fashion to the allocation of 
tasks. For performance-based pay and promotion (PBP) policies, two indicators load up on this 




and (2) whether rewards are widely distributed (staffreward, which equals 1 if all workers are 
rewarded upon target achievement, and 0 if only management receives rewards).  
--- Table 3 here --- 
To measure competitive pressures from imports (Import_compet) we use a question from 
the MOI survey which asks: “Do you compete with imports from abroad in your main product 
market?” Subsequently, we code all “yes” answers to this question as 1, and “no” answers as 0. All 
“I don’t know” answers are discarded from our sample. 
Finally to capture the stringency of labour regulations we use the index developed by 
Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004). This index captures different 
aspects of regulation of labour markets in 85 countries worldwide, which makes it particularly 
useful for cross-country comparisons as is the case here. Specifically the index (Labour_regul) 
covers three broad areas (1-employment laws; 2-collective relations laws, and 3-social security 
laws) which are then quantified through a variety of indicators from different sources3. This index 
has been extensively used both in economics and management studies seeking to compare and 
contrast labour regulations across countries (e.g., Levie and Autio, 2011; Van Hoorn, 2014; Bauer 
et al., 2018). Higher values of this index mean more stringent labour regulations in place. For 
instance Tunisia scores the highest (0.816) on this index, followed by Portugal (0.809), while 
Zambia (0.148) and Japan (0.164) score the lowest. The mean for all countries is 0.475 (Botero et 
al., 2004), while in our sample of countries the mean of this variable is 0.732. 
 
Control variables. To control for other factors affecting firm’s innovation (i.e., R&D investment) 
we add a set of control variables that have been found or are suspected to affect innovation activities 
of a firm by previous research (e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011; Zhou, Hong and Liu, 2013). 
 




These are standard controls in the literature, such as firm size – measured by the number of full-
time employees log transformed (ln_size), firm age (ln_age), foreign ownership dummy 
(foreign_own), state ownership dummy (state_own), degree of perceived competition 
(competition), and whether the firm has multiple establishments (multiest). In addition we include 
both industry-(at the level of 2-digit ISIC codes) and country fixed-effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across firms. 
 
 
4.2 Empirical specification 
Given the binary nature of our dependent variable (RD) we employ probit models in order to 
estimate the effects of the explanatory variables on our main proxy for firm innovation, i.e., R&D 
spending (Lederman, 2010; Krammer, 2019). Formally, we estimate the effect of management 
policies using the following equation: 𝑅𝐷𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐵𝑃 + 𝛽2𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐵𝑃 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝐵𝑃∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟_𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙 + 𝛽6𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟_𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑐 + 𝜆𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠+ 𝜎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜑𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖 , 
where i denotes a particular firm.  
4.3 Analysis and results 
The results of our estimations are presented in Table 4. In addition, we discuss (but do not report 
here due to space constraints) marginal effects for all these variables.  
--- Table 4 here --- 
Overall, the results of the control variables and in line with our expectations, and they 
remain constant throughout our models (Model 1). Specifically, we find that bigger firms are more 




but weak effect on firms’ propensity to invest in R&D. Finally, the lack of statistical significance 
for many of these variables is driven by the inclusion of both country and industry fixed effects 
which is able to explain a lot of the variation across firms in terms of engagement in R&D. In 
Model 2 we test our first hypothesis, namely the role of performance-based pay (PBP) policies. 
The coefficient of this variable is positive and highly statistically significant at less than 1 percent, 
thus confirming our Hypothesis 1. Overall, this result suggests that firms that employ more 
extensively PBP policies are more likely to engage in innovation by investing in R&D. Next we 
test our second hypothesis by analyzing job autonomy (JA). Again, the coefficient of this variable 
is positive and highly statistically significant at 5 percent, suggesting that greater job autonomy is 
positively associated with better innovative performance, i.e., greater likelihood of investing in 
R&D activities. The coefficients hold both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, 
suggesting that PBP and JA are distinct HRM measures that contribute additively to better firm 
innovative performance (Model 4). 
Models 5 and 6 test the potential moderating effect of external environment via an economic 
element, namely the competition from imports (Import_compet). We notice that the direct effect 
of this variable is positive and highly significant, appearing to complement and have a much larger 
magnitude than generic competition, which was used as a control in all our estimations. In terms 
of hypothesis testing, we find out that the coefficient of the interaction between import competition 
and performance pay is negative and statistically significant at 10% (Model 5) suggesting that 
reliance on performance pay schemes are weakly detrimental for a firm when facing severe 
competition from foreign owned firms. Nevertheless, the coefficient of the interaction between job 
autonomy and import competition is positive and significant at 5% suggesting that in such 




Models 7 and 8 test the potential moderating effect of external environment via an 
institutional element that is salient for HRM, namely the regulation of labour in these countries 
(Labour_regul). While our results overall suggest no strong direct relationship between labour 
regulations and firm innovation, labour regulation has a positive moderation effect on the 
relationship between job autonomy and innovative performance, in the sense that it enhances the 
effects of the latter (Models 8). For performance based pay, we do not find any significant 
moderating effects of labour institutions (Models 7). Finally, we include all variables and all 
interactions in a very conservative test of the robustness of these results (Model 9). The coefficients 
of our hypothesized direct and interaction effects hold to this test, despite losing some statistical 
significance (as expected) due to the saturation of these models and also the rise in terms of 
collinearity which pushes up standard errors of the point estimates. 
4.4 Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our conclusions regarding the importance of HR policies more broadly 
for innovation, we employ several additional tests. 
First, we use an alternate proxy for innovative performance, namely a measure of patenting 
activities of the firm (patents), as common proxy for innovation output, particularly in emerging 
and less developed markets where firms seldom patent abroad (e.g. Lederman, 2010; Furman, 
Porter and Stern, 2002; Krammer, 2014). This variable takes the value of 1 if the firm has registered 
any patents in its home country in the past year, and 0 if it has no patents (obtained also from the 
MOI Survey). The results of these additional regressions and marginal effects mirror our findings 
concerning R&D investment. They are not reported here due to space constraints but are available 
upon request. Magnitude-wise, the computed marginal effects indicate that a 1 unit change in JA 




a patent in the home country of the firm. Thus, these findings confirm to the role of HR policies in 
stimulating broadly innovation, both through engagement/commitments to innovative activities 
(i.e., R&D investments) as well in terms of its commercial outcomes (i.e., patents). 
Second, we also need to be mindful of any potential clustering effects occurring within our 
data, given its structure, namely firms being clustered within countries that are geographically 
segregated and also differentiated in terms of institutions, conditions for innovation, or cultural 
norms that affect HRM practices, etc. To account for potential clustering effects, we have carried 
out also estimations using a random-intercept mixed-effects (or hierarchical) multilevel probit 
model4. Specifically, we have modelled firm level innovation as nested in a given country j 
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Snijders and Bosker, 2011). Thus, we apply the following 
econometric model where firms are level 1 units, they are nested within countries (level 2 units): 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑐 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑐 + 𝐸𝑖𝑐 + 𝐶0𝑖𝑠ℎ=1  
RD is the binary dependent variable for innovation -whether a firm i operating in a country c invests 
in R&D or not. The 𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝛽ℎ are fixed effects (or “regular” regression estimated 
coefficients, and 𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑐 are independent or explanatory variables in our model. 𝐸𝑖𝑟𝑐  are firm (level 1) 
residuals, while 𝐶0𝑖 are random-effects accounting for firm variation within firms which are nested 
within countries. The interclass correlation coefficients suggest that about 7.09 percent of the 
variance in our DV comes from country-level factors, in comparison to 35.83 percent from firm-
level factors. These numbers suggest that multi-level regression does improve our explanatory 
power in a rather marginal fashion. Moreover, these regression results (available in Table A3 in 
 




Appendix A) confirm our main conjectures in regard to the role of HR policies towards firm 
innovation and their interplay with the institutional and economic external environment of the firm. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This work was motivated by two important rationales. First, to move beyond single-country studies 
and generalize the importance of HR policies for a key strategic area of firm performance, i.e., 
innovation (Lederman, 2010; McCann and Oxley, 2012) and second, to investigate how contextual 
conditions affect the relationship between HR policies and firm innovation. Remarkably, both of 
these questions remain unanswered by HR and innovation management scholars alike, and this 
attempt seeks to integrate these two rich yet unconnected streams of literature. In addition, given 
the significance variance in terms of economic and institutional environments around the world, 
we also seek to take advantage of this heterogeneity and achieve better generalizability regarding 
the effects of HR policies on innovation by testing these relationships in a trully international 
setting. 
To this end, we develop theoretical arguments that focus on two central themes of HR 
policies, namely performance-based pay (PBP) and job-autonomy (JA). Our arguments postulate 
that both of these factors will positively influence a firm’s ability to innovate. Furthermore, using 
elements from institutional theory we argue that the economic and institutional environment in 
which these firms are active will have an impact on the efficiency of these HR policies in spurring 
firm innovation. Our empirical setting employs a dataset of more than 900 firms across 12 
countries, most of them emerging markets. The seven variables (each measuring management 
policies) introduced to the PCA loaded up to two components that were tested in a probit model to 




our theoretical conjectures. Specifically, firms granting more autonomy for workers, giving 
performance feedback regularly and assessing bonuses and promotions based on the individual’s 
performance are more likely to engage in R&D (and patenting) and thus are more innovative than 
those not applying any of these HR policies. Moreover, import competition moderates negatively 
(i.e., weakens) the effects of PBP on innovation and positively (i.e., strengthens) the effects of JA 
on innovation. In turn, the quality of labour regulations in place moderates positively (i.e., 
strengthens) the effects of JA on innovation. 
 Subsequently we propose three key contributions. First, we theorize and test empirically 
the interplay between firms’ HR strategies and the contextual macro-environment in which they 
operate, by focusing on both economic and institutional tensions. In this way we are able to 
augment the existing literature by shedding light on the complex interactions between firms and 
the environment in which they operate (Kochan and Bamber, 2009). Specifically, we find that 
competitive pressures from imported goods and services (Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto, 2019; 
Traiberman, 2019) moderate the effects of HR policies on firm innovation. This suggest that in 
addition to internal factors that were explored by prior literature - e.g., organizational culture or 
management skills (Lau and Ngo, 2004; Park et al., 2019)-  external factors (to the firm) also play 
a role in determining how efficient their HR policies will be in stimulating their innovation. 
 Second, following recent calls in the literature to examine the role of formal and informal 
institutional settings in determining firm innovation (Krammer, 2019) we take a closer look at the 
role of formal regulations regarding labour in moderating the effects of HR policies such as 
performance based pay and job autonomy. In doing so we provide evidence that institutions matter 
also from the perspective of efficacy of HR policies, suggesting a delicate mix or balance to be 




 Third and final, we examine theoretically and test empirically the effect of two HR policies  
(i.e., job autonomy and pay/promotion incentives) on firm innovation via both inputs (i.e., R&D 
investments) and outputs of this process (i.e., patents). We are doing so in an international and 
comparative setting of 12 countries, which is advances the generalizability of our conclusions 
compared with prior studies that have usually been confined to firms in a single country (e.g., Lau 
and Ngo, 2004; Beugelsdijk, 2008; Ceylan, 2013; Andreeva et al, 2017).  
Our results showcase the importance of performance-based pay policies. While there is 
strong theoretical consensus for the role of PBP for firm performance, including innovation, 
empirical findings in this area remain rather inconclusive, often reporting ambiguous or 
contradictory results (e.g. Shalley, Zhou and Oldham, 2004; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005; 
Inderst, 2009). This strong positive result attests the importance of PBP policies in a wider and 
international context, thus contributing to debate about how extrinsic motives hinder the creativity 
of workers by pushing them to safe solutions and supporting the idea of an extrinsic motive to 
further foster creativity and innovation within organizations (Barros and Lazzarini, 2012). 
Our findings regarding job autonomy complement the scarce evidence in this area 
(Mumford, 2000; Beugelsdijk, 2008; Zoghi, Mohr and Meyer, 2010). It is important to see the 
channels through which increased autonomy encourages innovation, e.g. decisions on allocating 
tasks and setting the pace of work. Our results confirm a positive and strong link between job 
autonomy and organizational innovation likely through employee creativity and proactive risk 
taking. Dissolving the rigidities of splitting responsibilities for certain tasks in a pre-defined 
manner, and allowing for a little flexibility in setting the pace of work can give the confidence to 
workers to try new ideas or explore new possibilities (Shipton et al., 2005).  
Lastly, we are able to also confirm the complementary role of different HR policies as 




PBP and JA contribute in a positive and joint manner to firm innovation. While their individual 
impact is positive and significant we find no evidence of trade-offs, overlap or inefficiencies in 
terms of combining these policies. This is also consistent with the idea of more practices–better 
outcome promoted by Laursen and Foss (2003) in their influential HRM study. 
This research presents several practical implications for both managers and policy-makers. 
For the former, they need to configure their HR policies in such a way that they emphasize 
autonomy and performance-based measures as a way not only to incentivize employees to perform, 
but also stimulate the innovative performance of these firms. Clearly, these practices need to be 
implemented with flexibility such that well-performing employees are also granted greater 
autonomy to undertake and develop new business initiatives which in turn will drive innovation in 
these organizations. Complementarily, our results suggest significant contingencies to the effects 
of HR practices on firm probability to engage in innovation via R&D investments. We find that 
while greater competition from external (imported) products is associated with R&D investments, 
it also reduces the benefits of having performance based incentives. This provides evidence of a 
“double-edge sword” effect of stimulating or liberalizing markets for foreign firms and imports 
which is of interest to policy makers. In turn, greater import competition further amplifies the 
benefits of firms that have job autonomy policies in place. Finally, our results confirm a boosting 
effect for job autonomy measures concerning innovation from better labour regulations, suggesting 
again an avenue for policy makers to improve the innovativeness of their domestic firms by 
streamlining and making more flexible labour regulations in a given country. 
Notwithstanding the merits of this work, we also need to acknowledge some of its 
limitations. First, as briefly noted before, the results do not justify the notion that there exists a set 
of universal “best practices” that work in all situations – they might as well only be applicable 




also a possibility for future research by testing them in different settings. Second, as innovations 
are more and more related to intellectual property and know-how, it would be interesting to see a 
similar analysis carried out in the service industry, which is heavily pressured by the need for 
novelty and innovation. Another interesting direction for future research could be the testing of 
other proxies for innovation, particularly in the case of greater industry coverage. Third, our 
measure for R&D makes only a binary distinction between firms, which is robust in this sample, 
but also limits the extent of conclusions drawn from the results. In addition, R&D investment is 
measured only in one year limiting the available information (variance) within firms in terms of 
innovation investments across time. Better and more detailed indicators for innovation, 
unfortunately not avaible presently, could provide more insight into the economic magnitude and 
importance of HR policies for innovation and other firm outcomes. Fourth, similar to other recent 
studies who employ the MOI data (Maksimov et al., 2017; Bahl et al., 2020), we are bounded by 
the inherent limitations of this survey, namely its age (over a decade old now) and phrasing of 
available questions (usually in a binary yes/no manner and covering only one year, either past on 
current one). Given the research interest shown by different scholarly communities (i.e., 
innovation, international business, strategy) for this dataset, another round of MOI surveys would 
make a very welcomed opportunity for scholars across all these disciplines disciplines. Finally, 
from a myriad of contextual factors to be considered, we have focused on only two economic and 
institutional elements, which we deemed to be particularly salient for our research question. 
However, this consideration is by no means exhaustive; a future opportunity for researchers 
interested in this topic is to analyze and theorize the significance of other contextual factors which 
have not been covered in this study, such as political contexts, governmental support (through tax 




To conclude, this study demonstrates that HR policies are valuable instruments for firms 
seeking to spur their innovative performance and in doing so their competitive advantage in 
markets. It also showcases the importance of external factors of economic and institutional nature 
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations and correlations of variables employed 
 
No Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 RD 0.40 0.49 1 
          
2 ln_size 5.02 0.88 0.16* 1 
         
3 ln_age 3.14 0.96 0.05 0.25* 1 
        
4 multiest 0.30 0.46 0.06 0.11* 0.05 1 
       
5 foreign_own 0.10 0.30 0.04 0.07* -0.03  0.13* 1 
      
6 state_own 0.09 0.29 -0.03 0.13* 0.20*  -0.07* -0.08* 1 
     
7 competition 2.47 0.70 0.07* -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 1 
    
8 JA 0.02 1.19 0.08* 0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 1 
   
9 PBP 0.01 1.32 0.11* -0.03 -0.12* 0.04 -0.08* -0.05 0.03 0.02 1 
  
10 Labour_regul 0.62 0.15 0.03 0.11* -0.02 -0.20* -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.06 1 
 
11 Import_compet 0.73 0.44 0.15* 0.07* 0.023 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.15* 0.10* -0.01 -0.03 1 










Job autonomy  
(JA) 
taskallocation -0.005 0.693 
pacework -0.008 0.700 
perfcolfreq -0.060 -0.090 
perfshowfreq 0.055 0.080 
prodreward 0.705 -0.014 
staffreward 0.700 0.001 
underperf 0.062 0.103 
Eigen value 1.780 1.441 













Table 3. Variables employed in the Principal Component Analysis for HRM practices 






Variables Details Range 
taskallocation 
Allocation of tasks determined by: 
1–5 
1 – Only factory managers 
2 – Mostly factory managers 
3 – Factory managers and workers equally 
4 – Mostly workers 
5 – Only workers 
pacework 
Pace of work determined by: 
1–5 
1 – Only factory managers 
2 – Mostly factory managers 
3 – Factory managers and workers equally 
4 – Mostly workers 
5 – Only workers 
perfcolfreq 
Frequency of performance indicator collection: 
1–6 
1 – Yearly 
2 – Quarterly 
3 – Monthly 
4 – Weekly 
5 – Daily 
6 - Hourly 
perfshowfreq 
Frequency of showing performance indicators to workers: 
0–7 
0 – Never 
1 – Annually 
2 – Half-annually 
3 – Quarterly 
4 – Monthly 
5 – Weekly 
6 – Daily 
7 – Hourly  
prodreward Reward for achievement of production target? 0–1 
staffreward Is all staff is rewarded? 0–1 
underperf 
How underperformers are dealt with: 
1–3 
1 – Rarely or never moved from their positions 
2 – Usually stay in position for at least a year before action is 
taken 




Table 4. HR policies, the external environment, and firm innovative performance 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
ln_size 0.230*** 0.227*** 0.226*** 0.222*** 0.230*** 0.221*** 0.203*** 0.209*** 0.218*** 
 [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042]    [0.051] [0.051] [0.042] [0.042] [0.052]    
ln_age 0.02 0.033 0.022 0.035 0.024 0.01 0.053 0.04 0.039 
 [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040]    [0.048] [0.047] [0.039] [0.039] [0.047]    
multiest 0.097 0.087 0.096 0.087 0.024 0.049 0.200** 0.199** 0.087 
 [0.088] [0.088] [0.088] [0.088]    [0.106] [0.106] [0.081] [0.081] [0.097]    
foreign_own -0.028 0.001 -0.033 -0.005 0.163 0.127 -0.001 -0.045 0.153 
 [0.109] [0.110] [0.110] [0.110]    [0.146] [0.145] [0.110] [0.110] [0.146]    
state_own -0.095 -0.086 -0.095 -0.086 -0.194 -0.204 -0.151 -0.161 -0.218 
 [0.143] [0.143] [0.143] [0.143]    [0.159] [0.158] [0.139] [0.138] [0.156]    
competition 0.130** 0.125** 0.137*** 0.132**  0.148** 0.152** 0.130** 0.136*** 0.147**  
 [0.052] [0.052] [0.052] [0.052]    [0.064] [0.064] [0.052] [0.052] [0.065]    
H1: Performance-based pay  0.079***  0.077*** 0.228***  0.257+  0.349+   
                     (PBP)  [0.028]  [0.028]    [0.081]  [0.146]  [0.191]    
H2: Job Autonomy   0.078** 0.076**   -0.069  -0.131 -0.327+   
                     (JA)   [0.031] [0.031]     [0.076]  [0.139] [0.174]    
Import_compet     0.398*** 0.379***   0.406*** 
     [0.102] [0.102]   [0.104]    
H3a: PBP * Import_compet     -0.134+    -0.131+ 
     [0.077]    [0.076]    
H3b: JA * Import_compet      0.176**   0.161+   
      [0.086]   [0.088]    
Labour_regul       0.590** 0.425 0.245 




H4a: PBP * Labour_regul       -0.282  -0.200 
       [0.229]  [0.266]    
H4b: JA * Labour_regul        0.439** 0.426+   
        [0.217] [0.247]    
constant -2.866*** -2.893*** -2.842*** -2.870*** -2.999*** -2.817*** -2.721*** -2.626*** -2.868*** 
 [0.351] [0.351] [0.351] [0.352]    [0.429] [0.426] [0.324] [0.322] [0.401]    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes No No No    
N 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 944 944 1,266 1,266 944 
Log Likelihood -824.414 -820.511 -821.176 -817.411 -596.015 -599.651 -820.871 -821.293 -590.955 
LR Chi Square 78.2 86.005 84.676 92.205 78.939 71.668 85.285 84.44 89.059 
AIC 1666.827 1661.023 1662.351 1656.822 1216.03 1223.301 1663.742 1664.587 1213.91 
BIC 1713.12 1712.459 1713.787 1713.402 1274.232 1281.503 1720.322 1721.167 1291.512 














Food products and beverages 15 187 14.77 
Tobacco products 16 4 0.32 
Textiles 17 96 7.58 
Wearing apparel 18 82 6.48 
Tanning and dressing of leather 19 20 1.58 
Wood and wood cork products 20 22 1.74 
Paper and paper products 21 29 2.29 
Publishing, printing and recorded media 22 70 5.53 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23 5 0.39 
Chemicals and chemical products 24 78 6.16 
Rubber and plastics products 25 63 4.98 
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 77 6.08 
Basic metals 27 33 2.61 
Fabricated metal products 28 121 9.56 
Machinery and equipment 29 129 10.19 
Office, accounting and computing machinery 30 5 0.39 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 31 74 5.85 
Radio, television and communication equipment 32 17 1.34 
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 37 2.92 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 40 3.16 
Other transport equipment 35 20 1.58 
Furniture 36 47 3.71 
Recycling 37 10 0.79 
Total        - 1,266 100.0 






Table A2. Breakdown of the data by country 
Countries Obs. % 
Belarus 64 5.06 
Bulgaria 98 7.74 
Germany 172 13.59 
India 178 14.06 
Kazakhstan 98 7.74 
Lithuania 73 5.77 
Poland 54 4.27 
Romania 90 7.11 
Russia 153 12.09 
Serbia 92 7.27 
Ukraine 106 8.37 
Uzbekistan 88 6.95 






Table  3. Robustness checks: Multi-level mixed estimations 
Variables Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
ln_size 0.221*** 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.225*** 0.215*** 0.206*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 
 [0.043] [0.044] [0.043] [0.053] [0.053] [0.043] [0.043] [0.053]    
ln_age 0.013 0.024 0.018 0.031 0.021 0.03 0.015 0.044 
 [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.050] [0.049] [0.042] [0.042] [0.050]    
multiest 0.145 0.145 0.142 0.061 0.071 0.177+ 0.137 0.087 
 [0.093] [0.094] [0.093] [0.112] [0.111] [0.092] [0.093] [0.109]    
foreign_own -0.029 -0.003 -0.033 0.191 0.161 -0.008 -0.03 0.185 
 [0.114] [0.115] [0.114] [0.152] [0.151] [0.116] [0.115] [0.153]    
state_own -0.07 -0.057 -0.074 -0.149 -0.167 -0.081 -0.063 -0.175 
 [0.149] [0.150] [0.148] [0.168] [0.166] [0.149] [0.148] [0.166]    
competition 0.094+ 0.084 0.102+ 0.106 0.113+ 0.088 0.104+ 0.107 
 [0.053] [0.053] [0.054] [0.065] [0.065] [0.054] [0.054] [0.066]    
H1: PBP 0.093***  0.244***  0.265+  0.373+   
  [0.029]  [0.084]  [0.149]  [0.194]    
H2: JA   0.068**  0.087  -0.138 0.331+   
   [0.031]  [0.077]  [0.148] [0.175]    
Import_compet    0.399*** 0.383***   0.406*** 
    [0.104] [0.103]   [0.106]    
H3a: PBP * 
Import_compet    -0.140+    -0.136 
    [0.079]    [0.093]    
H3b: JA * 
Import_compet     0.192**   0.178**  
     [0.088]   [0.089]    
Labour_regul      0.483 0.517 0.013 
      [0.521] [0.423] [0.562]    
H4a: PBP * 
Labour_regul      -0.276  -0.216 
      [0.233]  [0.269]    
H4b: JA * 
Labour_regul       0.321+ 0.400 
       [0.181] [0.249]    
constant -2.768*** -2.774*** -2.762*** -3.064*** -2.867*** -2.482*** -2.427 -2.637*** 
 [0.452] [0.465] [0.446] [0.544] [0.534] [0.436] [51.259] [0.504]    
Firm RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,266 1,266 1,266 944 944 1,266 1,266 944 
Log Likelihood -818.946 -813.766 -816.521 -591.159 -595.568 -814.036 -816.499 -586.601 
AIC 1657.891 1649.531 1655.043 1208.318 1217.137 1652.073 1658.998 1207.202 




Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, +p<10. 
